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Abstract: It is a common understanding that human rights must be protected by States. Despite 
such fact, it is necessary to consider that the veil shielding private actors from the obligation to 
secure human rights no longer is sustainable in today’s globalized world. In this article, through 
the adoption of the deductive method and through a bibliographical and documental research, an 
analyses of the Ogoni Case, a case appreciated by the African Commission on Human Rights and 
Peoples Rights, is made, as a way to understand why multinational corporations (MNCs), should 
be jointly and severally liable with States in the case of violations to basic rights, as a way to secure 
human rights of the individuals and people of Africa.
Keywords: Ogoni Case; Human Rights; Multinational Corporations.
Resumo: É entendimento comum que os direitos humanos devem ser protegidos pelos Estados. Apesar 
disso, é necessário considerar que o véu que protege os atores privados da obrigação de garantir os 
direitos humanos não mais é sustentável no mundo globalizado de hoje. Neste artigo, por meio da 
adoção do método dedutivo e da realização de uma pesquisa bibliográfica e documental, é feita uma 
análise do Caso Ogoni, um caso apreciado pela Comissão Africana dos Direitos Humanos e dos Direitos 
dos Povos, como forma de entender por que as corporações multinacionais devem ser solidariamente 
responsáveis perante os Estados em caso de violação dos direitos básicos dos homens, como forma de 
garantir os direitos humanos dos indivíduos e das pessoas da África.
Palavras-chave: Caso Ogoni; Direitos Humanos; Corporações multinacionais.
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SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. 2. Tradition versus modernity. 3 The Ogoni Case, the 
African Charter and MNCs liability. Conclusion. References.
1 INTRODUCTION
As a general proposition, Human Rights obligations, be they from statute, 
international treaty or convention, are owed by the State. While it is true that 
since World War 2 a number of new subjects of international law have emerged 
including international organizations, national liberation movements and 
individuals, states are the ‘primary’ or ‘traditional’ subjects of international law 
(CASSESE, 1986), and it might be fair to say that States are reluctant to share 
that space with non-state entities.1 It is therefore States, which must secure 
citizens’ human rights and, where this does not happen in the domestic space, 
face censure from local courts. 
An infraction against international human rights treaty obligations is 
dealt with by the relevant international treaty enforcement procedures such 
as international tribunals, treaty bodies, United Nations organs, and regional 
enforcement mechanisms. Individuals have over the years gained rights of recourse 
through these enforcement mechanisms2 and can largely petition for redress. 
This process, however, is not always easy, nor does it always bring results, 
as States that do not respect human rights are typically not likely to be ones that 
create easy pathways for their citizens to seek redress.
2 TRADITION VERSUS MODERNITY 
Traditionally, it has always been the case that Human Rights obligations 
are not owed by multinational corporations (MNCs). While people have human 
rights, the obligation to respect and protect them lies with their respective 
States.3 That is because MNCs have not been seen as, and are not accepted as, 
being subject to international law. And, as human rights discourse has developed, 
1 It is usually non-state actors - especially corporations – who are the ones who primarily resist hav-
ing direct human rights obligations under international law. The same is true of IFIs like the World 
Bank and the IMF. See WILLS, J. “The World Turned Upside Down? Neo-Liberalism, Socioeconomic 
Rights, and Hegemony,” Leiden Journal of International Law, 27(1): 11, 20142 As well as becoming subject to the jurisdiction of international criminal law
3 According to an early formulation, it was stated that ‘a tacit assumption underlying much dis-
cussion of Human Rights seems to be that, although all persons have these rights, the obligation 
corresponding to a persons’ rights lies only on his or her own government”. NELSON, W.N. Human 
Rights and Human Obligations. In: PEACOCK, J.R; CHAPMAN, J.W. (eds). Human Rights. New York: 
New York University Press, 1981, p. 281.
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this has been identified and sometimes accepted without much criticism, but as 
indicative of a failure of international law to find ways to bring in MNCs into the 
fold as obligated to uphold human rights at the pain of sanction. Writing in 2001, 
the Harvard Law Review stated that: 
Though corporations are capable of interfering with the enjoyment 
of a broad range of human rights, international law has failed both to 
articulate the human rights obligations of corporations and to provide 
mechanisms for regulating corporate conduct in the field of human 
rights. Since the nineteenth century, international law has addressed 
almost exclusively the conduct of states. Traditionally, states were 
viewed as the only “subjects” of international law, the only entities 
capable of bearing legal rights and duties.4
There is evidence that international human rights discourse is moving away 
from this view. The Human Rights Council has begun discussions on a binding 
instrument that covers MNCs and businesses in general (HUMANS RIGHTS 
COUNCIL, 2014; RATNER, 2001; SANTORO, 2010). It has been argued that a 
binding treaty would be the best way to cover the lacuna created by the current 
position where ‘in cases where the state cannot be shown to be culpable or complicit 
in the harm caused, there will be no-one who will be legally responsible despite 
the fact that a violation of rights has occurred’ (BILCHITZ, 2010). It is submitted 
that in some cases however, emphasis placed on this lacuna blinds the focus on 
existing mechanisms and innovative ways of interpreting these to find that in 
fact, corporations can and should be found to already have obligations under 
international human rights law. In my view, some existing treaties such as the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter) are capable 
of being interpreted to allow for the inference that there are legally binding and 
enforceable obligations on MNCs to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. 
Given that in today’s globalised world, many MNCs5 control budgets that 
are bigger than entire national budgets of most (if not all) third world countries, 
this is an important issue. At the turn of the millennium, right when the Harvard 
Law Review was making the observation above, the evidence showed that MNCs 
already controlled some 20-30% and 70% of world output and trade respectively 
4 ‘Developments in the Law-Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law,’ 
114. HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2030-31 (2001) p.225
5 The reference to MNCs in this article does not include the many NGOs and other purely philan-
thropic organizations, which though run by business people, are purely philanthropic, but rather 
those entities that are strictly for profit, (such as, in the Ogoni case, infra, Shell) whether or not they 
have a philanthropic arm. The key distinction is that MNCs referred to in this article are for profit 
enterprises. 
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(HELD et al, 1999).6 Kinley and Tadaki have argued that these corporations ‘are 
the driving agents of the global economy, exercising dominant control over global 
trade, investment, and technology transfers. Flowing directly from such positions of 
economic influence, [they] also manage to exercise considerable political leverage 
in both domestic and international spheres” (KINLEY; TADAKI, 2004).7 In many 
respects, many MNCs have as much, if not more, power than most states. It has 
further been said that the business that these MNCs control spans the entire 
world “linking the fortunes of disparate communities and nations in complex webs 
of interconnectedness” (HELD et al, 1999). The power that comes with this much 
influence rivals and in some cases surpasses that which some Third World States 
can muster. 
Because of this power, it is inevitable that MNCs leave footprints in the civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural spheres of many people’s lives.8 With 
reference to the complaint in the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (the Commission) in the Ogoni Case (ACHPR, 2001)9 where a large part 
relates to actions of a multinational oil company, I posit that the case for making 
MNCs jointly and severally liable with States as obligation bearers under the 
African Charter would better secure the human rights of the individuals and 
peoples of Africa. I argue further that the language of the African Charter does 
not preclude such an interpretation. 
The reason for this view is that not only do corporations have the political 
power and influence to affect people’s human rights, but that they have in 
some cases an incentive to do so: profit (HELD et al, 1999). For this reason, it 
is necessary to consider whether the veil shielding private actors from the 
obligation to secure human rights is necessary. In order to curb corporate greed, 
and avoid situations where corporations instrumentalise political proxies within 
the polities where they operate to induce or even create conditions that lead to 
human rights violations, that shield should no longer be regarded as sustainable. 
6 Some ten years later, as of 2010, this situation had not changed. See:  BUCKINX, Barbara C.J. 
Reducing Domination in Global Politics. Princeton University PhD Dissertation, June 2010. 
At: <https://search.proquest.com/openview/1867fd227108b0ca7edf04216733a6b4/1?pq-
origsite=gscholar&cbl=187 50&diss=y>. Accessed on 08 September 2017; and EZEUDU, Martin-
Joe. (2011), infra. who refers to MNCs as ‘modern leviathans’. 7 The article comprehensively addresses the evolution of MNCs’ position vis-a-vis international human 
rights law as well as the arguments against extending direct human rights liabilities to them. 8 Duruigbo, infra, at p.239, citing David Adedayo Ijalaye, ‘The extension of corporate personality in 
international law’ 221- 23 (1978) argues that ‘MNCs can now be regarded as selective subjects of 
international contract law for contracts entered into with states.’
9 David Bilchitz (2010) also makes reference to this case as indicative of why the current regime is 
inadequate. 
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The reason why this would be a good development is the practical benefits 
to individuals and their countries in the developing world. Corporations doing 
business in poor countries would no longer be able to hide behind the protection 
of regimes whose survival depends on repressing their citizens while at the 
same time financially propped up by the backhanded deals that are endemic 
in the transactional relationships between MNCs and Thirds World countries.10 
Propping up undemocratic regimes for the purposes of extracting wealth on 
the cheap will no longer be as attractive if individuals can go against the MNCs 
directly, including in the MNCs’ home countries, for violations of human rights.11 
Instead, MNCs would be encouraged to act in ways that are consistent with 
international human rights law, knowing that there is no buffer between them 
and direct liability.12  
If respect for human rights is a societal good, and protection thereof a 
positive societal goal, then it should not matter whether that protection is from 
violations by the state or non-state actors (BILCHITZ, 2010). The protection of 
individuals’ human rights must ensue only from a violation of said rights and not 
be dependent on the nature of the persona causing the violation. This leads to a 
more universal (in the sense of coverage) protection of human rights, and also 
introduces into the human rights field players with the financial means to not 
only influence states to better protect human rights, but to compensate victims. 
Corporations being obligated to protect and respect human rights would also 
help operationalize the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(the Guiding Principles) (OCHCHR, 2012).13
10 See for example the Al Yamamah arms deal, summarised in  Tim Jarrett and Claire Taylor: Bribery 
allegations and BAE UK House of Commons Standard Note SN/BT/5367: researchbriefings.files.
parliament.uk/documents/SN05367/SN05367.pdf. Accessed on 08 September 2017. Although 
this did not involve a MNC, it is perhaps evidence of how secretive and potentially lucrative (for 
Third Word politicians) it is to do business with powerful corporations from the West. 11 See a discussion on suing in the MNCs’ home country or other foreign jurisdiction in Fellmeth, 
Aaron Xavier (2002) “Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.: A New Standard for the Enforcement 
of International Law in U.S. Courts?,” Yale Human Rights and Development Journal: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, 
Article 7. Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol5/iss1/7 (accessed 08 Sep-
tember 2017).12 After Shell initially arguing forum non conveniens, and succeeding in a lower court, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower court and indicated a willingness to entertain 
claims against human rights violations abroad. It was reported in 2009 that the case was eventually 
settled out of Court for $15.5million http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/settlement-
reached-human-rights-cases-against-royal-dutch/shell (accessed 08 September 2017)   
13 For a critique of why the Guiding Principles are an inadequate substitute for a treaty and debates 
around the SRSG Report, see David Bilchitz (2010). See also D. Bilchitz ‘A chasm between ‘is’ 
and ‘ought’? A critique of the normative foundations of the SRSG’s Framework and the Guiding 
Principles’ in S.Deva and D. Bilchitz (eds.), Human rights obligations of business: Beyond the 
corporate responsibility to respect? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013) 111-114, as 
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This is not a novel approach, but part of a growing line of thinking in 
international human rights jurisprudence. In 2013, David Bilchitz (2013) argued 
that in fact, corporations do have actionable obligations to respect human rights 
at international law. Earlier, when commenting on the question of corporate 
accountability and liability under international human rights law, Emeka Duruigbo 
(2008) had identified evidence of a shift towards integrating corporations as 
bearers of obligations. Duruigbo cited the UN Special Representative of the 
Secretary General’s (SRSG) report of February 2007 as indicating that
[…] in the course of the past few decades, the legal status of corporations 
in international law has shifted to some extent from the classical position, 
with corporations now considered bearers of duties under international 
criminal law. The SRSG believes that while this shift is emerging in the 
international criminal context, it has not yet extended to other aspects of 
human rights law. [The] report notes, however, that significant changes 
are occurring in the domestic and international planes that suggest 
that a more far-reaching shift, that would more fully integrate private 
business enterprises into the international legal system, will occur some 
time in the near future (DURUIGBO, 2008, p. 224). 
That SRSG Report was part of a process that included the work of the UN 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, which in 
August 2003 had produced a report14 viewed as part of a pioneering soft law 
codification of practice (WEISSBRODT; KRUGER, 2003), albeit one that was not 
fully acknowledged by the SRSG (BILCHITZ, 2010). Instead, the SRSG argued that 
international law at best imposes on indirect obligations on corporations, and not 
direct obligations (HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL, 2007), but that this position was 
largely because states had in fact not placed such obligations on corporations: 
Long-standing doctrinal arguments over whether corporations could be 
“subjects” of international law, which impeded conceptual thinking about 
and the attribution of direct responsibility to corporations, are yielding to 
new realities. Corporations increasingly are recognized as “participants” 
at the international level, with the capacity to bear some rights and duties 
under international law. . . . [T]hey have certain rights under bilateral 
investment treaties; they are also subject to duties under several civil 
liability conventions dealing with environmental pollution. Although this 
well as J Nolan, ‘The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Rights: Soft Law or Not Law?’ in S. Deva 
and D. Bilchitz (eds.), Human rights obligations of business: Beyond the corporate responsibility to 
respect? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013), 138.
14 Titled ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection 
of Human Rights Resolution 2003/16, 13 August 2003.
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has no direct bearing on corporate responsibility for international crimes, 
it makes it more difficult to maintain that corporations should be entirely 
exempt from responsibility in other areas of international law ((HUMAN 
RIGHTS COUNCIL, 2007, paragraph 35).
Violations of human rights by MNCs can be addressed by empowering 
countries to use both local legislation and international recognition of their right 
to do so within international human rights law to put in place a preventative 
regime. That MNCs are players on the international plane but are not completely 
subject to the laws and rules governing that space creates a problem that 
operates in their favor. The very dearth of references to the MNC involved in the 
Ogoni case, despite the fact that it was the primary beneficiary of the abuses 
committed, shows how lopsided and unsatisfactory the current position is in 
practice. That correct position would be to create legal obligations, recognized 
under international human rights law, mandating that corporations, just like 
states, have an obligation to respect and, where they are in business and in 
relation to their employees, to protect human rights.
Clearly, the obligation to protect would need to be qualified, so that it does 
not entail asking MNCs to effectively be at par with the State in its obligations as 
regards to its citizens. A sensible qualification would be to limit the duty to those 
areas where the company’s business and policies directly and indirectly impact 
its employees and those that are impacted by its business. The question of who is 
impacted by a particular MNC’s business would be an objectively verifiable fact: 
for example, a corporation involved in diamond mining operations that result in 
the State moving people from their homes to make way for mining operations 
clearly impacts on those people. Such people ought to be able to look to both 
the state and the company to ensure that in the process of being moved, their 
fundamental rights such as the right to property, fair and adequate compensation, 
equal protection of the law, prior consultation and right to petition through an 
impartial judicial process are respected. 
The important point to note is not that such obligations will need to be 
carefully balanced. Rather, the fact that the debate is still on whether or not 
such legal obligations exist in the first place is unacceptable given the influence 
that MNCs wield. And, as Kinley and Tadaki have argued, MNCs “have the 
ability significantly to affect the nature, form and extent of social relations. By 
virtue, specifically, of their economic and political muscle, [MNCs} are uniquely 
positioned to affect, positively and negatively, the levels of enjoyment of human 
rights.”(KINLEY; TADAKI, 2004).
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3 THE OGONI CASE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER AND MNCS LIABILITY
In this communication (the language used by the Commission for a case) the 
factual background and the arguments indicated that  the government of Nigeria, 
through the State oil company, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company 
(NNPC), was working with a MNC, Shell Petroleum Development Corporation 
(Shell),  in oil extraction operations “and that these operations have caused 
environmental degradation and health problems resulting from the contamination 
of the environment among the Ogoni People”(paragraph 1). It was further alleged, 
inter alia, that the government had aided and abetted these activities by refusing 
to allow independent scientific and environmental studies on the health impact 
of the oil operations (paragraph 5) and by “placing the legal and military powers 
of the state at the disposal of the oil companies” (paragraph 3), and “neither 
monitored operations of the oil companies nor required safety measures that are 
standard procedure within the industry” (paragraph 4).
The Commission noted an international consensus to the effect that “all rights, 
both civil and political rights and social and economic, generate at least four levels 
of duties for a State that undertakes to adhere to a rights regime, namely the duty to 
respect, protect, promote and fulfil these rights” (paragraph 44) The Commission 
buttressed its reasoning with reference to Article 2(1) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which obligates States 
to take steps “…by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures” and found that the state has a duty to make “concerted action” 
(paragraph 48) to ensure enjoyment of the human rights. Following an examination 
of the claimed violations and in the absence of any contest from the government 
around the facts (paragraph 49), the Commission made a finding that the State had 
violated the African Charter (paragraph 58) because  
[…] in the present case, despite its obligation to protect persons against 
interferences in the enjoyment of their rights, the Government of 
Nigeria facilitated the  destruction of Ogoniland. Contrary to its Charter 
obligations and despite such internationally established principles, the 
Nigerian Government has given the green light to private actors, and 
the oil companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-being of 
the Ogonis. By any measure of standards, its practice falls short of the 
minimum conduct expected of States.
There was no finding of liability against the state oil company or the MNC. 
David Bilchitz (2010) has remarked at the absurdity of this finding, stating that “the 
fact that the Commission focused its attention only on the actions and obligations of 
the government is puzzling: the oil companies could arguably have been said to have 
primary responsibility for the harms caused yet the Commission never addresses 
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their responsibilities directly.” It is inconceivable that the Nigerian government’s 
liability extended beyond aiding and abetting the destructive operations of the oil 
companies, and more likely that the positive actions of both Shell and NNPC caused 
all the damage. Yet all legal liability accrued to the State. The Commission therefore 
took the view that there is nothing in place both in the Charter or Nigerian law that 
could have created legally binding human rights obligations against Shell. 
Yet, Article 1 of the African Charter specifically enjoins member states to 
“undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect” to the rights in the 
Charter. Article 16(2) of the African Charter explicitly enjoins states to “take all 
necessary measures to protect”. This is a similar obligation to that under Article 2(1) 
of the ICESCR, which places an obligation on states to use legislation to protect to 
human rights. In the Ogoni case, the Commission proceeds from the viewpoint that 
this is limited to placing an obligation on the state alone to protect human rights. 
The question whether the state should, in the process of adopting ‘legislative 
or other measures to give effect’ or taking ‘all necessary measures to protect’, also 
pass an equal duty to secure human rights on another entity (in this case both the 
local and foreign oil companies) is never canvassed. It must be recalled that there 
is no reason why international human rights law would forbid a state imposing 
direct human rights obligations on non-state actors. And there is precedence on 
the regional level, South Africa has done so through 8(2) of the Constitution.15
Instead, the Commission focused on the State’s duty to protect citizens from 
“damaging acts that may be perpetrated by private parties”, and relied on jurisprudence 
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights16 and the European Court of Human 
Rights17 for support of the proposition that there is such a duty.  The failure to take 
note of a relevant regional example is symptomatic of a consistent weakness in the 
Commission’s decisions and might speak to issues of the quality of argument when 
cases are brought to it,18 but it still does represent a missed opportunity. 
15 Which provides that ‘A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and 
to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any 
duty imposed by the right.’
16 Velàsquez Rodríguez v. Honduras judgment of July 19 1988, Series C, No. 4.17 X and Y v. Netherlands 91 ECHR (1985) (Ser. A) at 32.18 In an unpublished work: Tinomudaishe Chinyoka, Neither African nor Necessary: the Problematic 
Reasoning of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Regarding ‘Indigeneity’ in 
the Endorois case, Dissertation Submitted for the Master of Studies Degree in International 
Human Rights Law University of Oxford 2016, I make the argument that decisions of the African 
Commission are affected by poor argument and that this explains some glaring inconsistencies. For 
example,Communication 276/03 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 
Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council)  v. Kenya  (2009) AHRLR 75 (ACHPR 2009) (27th Activity 
Report), dealing with the question of the meaning of ‘peoples’, makes no reference whatsoever to the 
African Commission’s own earlier decision in Communication 266/03, Gunme and others v Cameroon 
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There is nothing in the language of the Charter that supports this limitation. 
There is nothing that stops the State from using legislation to place obligations on 
other entities to respect and protect human rights.19 While it is arguable that at face 
value this might be tantamount to advocating for the state parties to the Charter 
to pass on their obligations to another party, this is in fact not the case. First, 
the language of the Charter makes clear that the State has a primary obligation 
to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the obligations of the Charter. Passing that 
duty over in a way that would then absolve the state of its duty is not a possible 
interpretation of the language of the Charter. The example of section 8(2) of the 
South African Constitution shows that this is not a very difficult legislative feat. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the seemingly wide discretion20 
given in the words “shall take the necessary steps”21 appears to be one that offers a 
wide range of possibilities to the States. It suggests that there is a wide discretion 
as to what can be done under to give effect to the Charter. And, as long as a 
measure will result in the protection of rights then it is necessary (or “needful,” 
“requisite,” “essential,” “conducive to,”) and therefore needed to be done, thus 
permissible under the Charter definition. Clearly, any measure that results in 
additional protection over and above what is available from the State can only be 
regarded as necessary or essential for the purposes of fulfilling the requirements 
of the Charter. In Avocats sans Frontieres (on behalf of Gaetan Bwampamye) v. 
Burundi (ACHPR, 2000)22 the African Commission observed as against Burundi 
that contrary to Article 1 the African Charter, the country had not only failed to 
recognise the fundamental “rights, obligations and freedoms proclaimed in the 
Charter, [but also to] take measures to give effect to them” (ACHPR, 2000).
(2009) AHRLR 9 (ACHPR 2009) (26th Activity Report) 
19 Joe J. Wills, who reviewed an early draft of this article, made this comment on this point: “This is 
clearly correct. But it is also true to say that there is nothing that requires them to do so as well.” 20 It could also be argued that the words are in fact peremptory, as evidenced by the use of ‘shall’, 
placing an obligation on the State to use any and all conceivable (as opposed to preferred) means 
to protect human rights. 21 On the import of the word ‘necessary’, see the discussion by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 4 Wheat. 316 316 (1819). at page 17 U.S. 418: ‘Does [the word “necessary”] always 
import an absolute physical necessity so strong that one thing to which another may be termed 
necessary cannot exist without that other? We think it does not. If reference be had to its use in the 
common affairs of the world or in approved authors, we find that it frequently imports no more than 
that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another. To employ the means necessary to 
an end is generally understood as employing any means calculated to produce the end, and not as 
being confined to those single means without which the end would be entirely unattainable.….. [T]
he word “necessary” means “needful,” “requisite,” “essential,” “conducive to,”. At:  <https://supreme.
justia.com/cases/federal/us/17/316/case.html> Accessed on 08 September 2017.22 The same observation was also made against Zambia in Communication 211/98, Legal Resources 
Foundation v. Zambia, Fourteenth Activity Report 2000-2001, Annex V.
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In line with its tradition of always looking for an expansive interpretation 
of the Charter,23 the Commission found (in the Ogoni case) that ‘there is no right 
in the African Charter that cannot be made effective’ (paragraph 69) but then 
limited itself by finding that part of that process should not 
[…] fault States that are labouring under difficult circumstances 
to improve the lives of their people…[and that the] intervention of 
multinational corporations may be a potentially positive force for 
development if the State and the people concerned are ever mindful of 
the common good and the sacred rights of individuals and communities. 
Being liable for the protection of human rights on the one hand and being a 
positive force for development need not be mutually exclusive. 
It is true that there are a number of alternatives to ensuring that corporations 
act in a way that respects the law, such as effectively regulating corporate 
conduct, prosecuting corporate criminality, providing compensation for victims 
of corporate abuse24 and adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law. 
However, because of the dynamics inherent in the uneven relationship between 
MNCs and Third World states, many of these measures presuppose the existence 
of both the will and the ability on the part of the State, where in fact there might 
be none. Given the size and power that some MNCs have, it is inconceivable that 
some developing states would have the power to effectively regulate or prosecute 
them (EZEUDU, 2011),25 even if there was a will to take such steps.26 
In this regard, I would suggest that the focus on promoting corporate social 
responsibility is somewhat misguided, and that the best guarantee for what this 
focus seeks to achieve would be to place an obligation to protect human rights. The 
former is voluntary and self -defined, much like asking a patient to decide which 
23 But see however the debate in Malcolm Evans, Rachel Murray (eds): The African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights: The System in Practice 1986–2006 (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2008) at p.174, where the ‘expansive interpretation’ seems to be something of a case by case 
phenomenon. 
24 I am indebted to Joe J. Wills for helping me develop this point. 
25 Martin-Joe Ezeudu (2011), also commenting on the activities of Shell in the Niger delta and the 
facts surrounding the Ogoni case, argues for an expansion of the International Criminal Court’s 
jurisdiction to include the power to prosecute MNCs. 
26 And, given the decision of the African Commission in Communication 245/2002, Zimbabwe Human 
Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, Twenty-first Activity Report 2007, Annex III, which adopted the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court in Velasquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Series C, No.4, Human 
Rights Law Journal 9 (1988) 212, it is the State that bears the obligation to prevent, to investigate and 
to punish the actions of non-state actors when they affect human rights. Given that in that case the 
evidence showed a direct link between the Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association as an arm 
of the ruling party, the fact that the African Commission still found that they were a non-state actor 
goes to show the hurdle that litigants have when going against powerful opponents.  
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disease they want to decide that they have and then treat it, rather than having 
an independent diagnosis and a tried and tested formula for addressing it. It has 
not been shown that companies’ commitment to corporate social responsibility, 
like corporate codes of conduct, can ever be “more than public relations exercises 
- fig leaves for exploitation- the latest in a long title of efforts by firms to escape 
responsibility for the production conditions from which they profit…”(KEARNEY, 
2000, p. 1359).
According to Steiner and Alston, at the very least, “the human rights 
obligations assumed by each government require it (or should require it) to use all 
appropriate means to ensure that actors operating within its territory subject to 
its jurisdiction comply with national legislation designed to give effect to human 
rights”(STEINER; ALSTON, p. 1349). Clearly, given that one basic reason for having 
a human rights protection mechanism is that in instances where this is likely to 
become an issue is that some states do not respect this duty, it is incumbent upon 
States to use the language of human rights instruments to widen the net for to 
cover all possible holders of the duty to respect  and uphold.  
This is especially so when, such as in the Ogoni case, it is clear that the reason 
why the violations occurred, and in deed were aided and abetted by the state, was 
for the benefit of private companies. The influence that MNCs have over States, 
especially in Africa, cannot be underestimated. States are discouraged from 
close regulatory oversight by the economic benefits that come from creating an 
enabling environment. Indeed, Steiner and Alston  concede that states are often 
powerless to resist MNCs. This is because of the economic need for investment 
and the need to reduce operating costs, because “in the context of increasing 
global mobility of capital, competition among potential host countries discourages 
initiatives that may opus up labour costs and make one country less attractive 
than others with lower regulatory standards - the so-called race to the bottom” 
(STEINER; ALSTON, p. 1349). This is further complicated by the fact that in these 
poor countries, even those MNCs that are committing human rights violations 
sometimes still pay better than the alternative.27
It is time that the orthodox (CHOW, 1988) understanding of human rights as 
applicable only to states (CLAPHAM, 1993) must give way to a reality that looks 
at the modern world for what it is: a hybrid of actors and actions that blur the 
divide between state and private enterprise. To continue to argue that MNCs only 
27 A Human Rights Watch report from August 1996 examined the systematic discrimination against 
women at the expert processing factories (Maquiladoras) on the US-Mexico border and found 
that despite these violations, these companies offered better pay to the local population than the 
alternatives, forcing the locals to put up with the human rights violations. https://www.hrw.org/
legacy/reports/1996/Mexi0896.htm (accessed 17/07/17)
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interact with international law through their States (CHOW, 1988) is to avoid 
reality. In other words, I submit that rather than have an argument whether that 
corporations should bear human rights obligations under domestic law through 
specific legislation passed to that effect, the debate should really be  on whether 
similar obligations should also ensue from international human rights law.28 
According to Duruigbo (2008, p. 228), “international law cannot continue to play 
the ostrich and pretend that these corporations can be under the effective control 
of national laws and institutions only.” Privatisation in many European countries 
means that purely state functions are now carried out by private, usually 
MNCs, on behalf of the state. In the United Kingdom, private companies run 
prisons,29 carried out some police functions,30 and are in involved immigration 
enforcement.31 To suggest that once so contracted out, these activities are outside 
the oversight of human rights treaties would be absurd.32  Instead, and to adapt 
the words of Cane in relation to administrative law into the human rights context:
[…] what matters for questions for questions of legal liability is the 
nature of the activity, not the identity of the person or body conducting: 
and since activities are not by their nature either public or private, the 
distinction is irrelevant to the regulation and control of human activity 
(CANE, 1987)
Reading existing human rights treaties as already empowering states 
to share their obligations with MNCs is arguably better than trying to create 
new instruments specifically directed at companies. To begin with, because 
International Treaties require voluntary signup, it is unlikely that many MNCs 
would sign up to any robust process that affected their bottom-line. Secondly, 
when these instruments have been attempted33 that have been largely aspirational, 
28 If it is possible to make individuals liable for criminal wrongdoing under international law, it seems 
odd that corporations, which rely on their distinctive legal persona to effectively stand separate 
from their shareholders, cannot be equally liable. See also Peter Muchlinski, ‘Limited Liability and 
Multinational Enterprises: A Case for Reform?’ (2010) 34 Cambridge Journal of Economics 915
29 See HM Prison Service https://www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmps/contracted-out (accessed 01 
September 2017) 
30 See The Guardian: Private security firm G4S to run Lincolnshire police station, 22 February 2012 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/feb/22/g4s-run-police-station-lincolnshire (accessed 
08 September 2017) 
31 See The Telegraph: ‘G4S staff suspended after claims of abuse on detainees at immigration 
removal centre’ 1 September 2017 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/09/01/g4s-staff-
suspended-claims-abuse-detainees-immigration-removal/ (accessed 08 September 2017)
32 Indeed, the practice in the UK from the news reports are that these companies are then held 
to the same standards as would the state if it was carrying out these functions. The fact that it is 
possible to hold corporations to those standards should mean that placing direct legal obligations 
on them to respect human rights is not impossible. 
33 See for example Amnesty International’s ‘Human Rights Principles for Companies’, January 
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relying on MNCs’ supposed concerns about protecting repetitional damage and 
avoiding the creation of unstable operating environments. Unfortunately, these 
aspirations, though noble, do not address the practicalities of doing business in 
the environments where this is ever an issue: sometimes these companies profit 
from instability. What if it is cheaper to pay bribes to some regional warlord 
than taxes to a national entity? Isn’t it in fact the case that MNCs move from the 
west to poorer countries because of the low operating costs, which in turn are 
a result of “weak labour laws and enforcement, and restrictions on trade union 
activity, [conditions which in turn lead] to violations of internationally recognised 
rights”(STEINER; ALSTON, p. 1354) and enforcement mechanisms? 
CONCLUSION 
In the field of human rights, it is should matter who has committed the human 
rights violation, be they a private entity or a state body. Either should carry the 
obligation to uphold international and national human rights law. Since it matters 
not to the nature of the harm suffered by the holder of the right whether the 
violator was a state or someone doing it for profit, maintaining the distinction is 
an anachronism which protects private business for no justifiable reason. In the 
Ogoni case, the Commission passed up on an opportunity to find that one of the 
‘necessary steps’ that the Nigerian government ought to have taken in protecting 
the rights of the Ogoni people was to place an obligation on the two oil companies 
to uphold the rights in the Charter in their operations in Ogoniland.34 
So, rather than finding that the Nigerian government was liable as it did, in 
my view the Commission ought to have made a specific finding that the Nigerian 
government had not done everything necessary by failing to enact legislation 
making corporations like Shell directly liable for human rights violations. At 
first glance this might appear like a contradiction in that it seems to presuppose 
a power that most Third World States will quite simply not have against giant 
MNCs. However, if international human rights law recognized such an obligation, 
and placed on corporations a legally enforceable duty to respect human rights as 
subjects of international law, this would take the pressure away from the States 
in the developing world, who would simply be implementing an international 
law obligation.
1998, AI Index: ACT 70/01/98 https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/148000/
act700011998en.pdf (accessed 17/07/17)
34 This failure on the part of the state did not absolve the state of its own obligations to protect, but 
MNCs will invariably have deeper pockets to make restitution and, perhaps more importantly, a 
reason to avoid incurring the liability in the first place: profit. 
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